Colorado’s second-highest court concluded on Thursday that an Arapahoe County judge’s visible display of emotion during a child victim’s testimony should not trigger a new trial for the defendant.

A three-judge Court of Appeals panel found that defendant Philip Morgan had failed to show how the reaction by District Court Judge Ryan Stuart during trial was harmful to him.

“None of this is to suggest that we are unconcerned about this record. Courts must be fair and impartial,” wrote Judge Stephanie Dunn in the May 7 opinion. “And while no one is impervious to emotion, courts must maintain decorum and emotional control. Unfortunately, that doesn’t always happen. More commonly, emotions spill out in intemperate or ill-advised comments, leading to claims of bias and prejudice.”

Jurors convicted Morgan in 2022 on two counts of sexual assault against a child. He received a sentence of 50 years to life in prison.

After the 12-year-old victim began testifying, there was a break in the proceedings. The defense attorney stated that he had seen Stuart “tearing up” while the child was speaking. The lawyer was concerned that Stuart’s reaction inappropriately signaled that he found the victim credible, and the defense moved for a mistrial.

Stuart acknowledged that he “felt tears welling up,” but “no tears ever came out.” He said that he had immediately grabbed a legal text and began to read to distract himself. Although Stuart noticed the defense lawyer looking at him, he did not see any jurors paying attention.

Stuart also clarified that the jury would have seen him from an angle, and his clerk had not noticed him tearing up. Stuart did not immediately rule on the request for a mistrial, and said he needed to research the issue.

The next day, Stuart said he allowed his emotions “to become temporarily observable to at least some people in the courtroom.”

“Any human being with any emotion or empathy feels emotion just hearing that testimony, regardless of whether you think it was true or not true,” he continued. “Now, I’m not saying that I should have displayed any emotion. I should not have. That was improper. It was certainly not intentional, and it came quickly and surprised me when it happened. But to believe that a juror would then make the leap that I found (the victim) more credible because I had a brief moment of not acting like a robot up here — I think that’s another assumption that I would have to make quite a leap and speculate.”

Stuart asked if the defense lawyer wanted to question the jury about what they saw. Although the lawyer expressed interest, he ultimately declined the offer. Stuart then denied the motion for a mistrial.

On appeal, Morgan argued Stuart’s reaction during the victim’s testimony violated his right to a fair trial.

“Even if a juror had noticed the court’s eyes — though the record does not suggest that any juror did — this would not have required a mistrial,” countered Assistant Attorney General Jaycey DeHoyos. There was “no evidence that the court’s slight and unobtrusive emotional reaction created an unacceptable risk of impacting the jury.”

“There is good reason why appellants need not prove prejudice: it’s impossible to precisely measure the impact of a judge signaling that he finds the complaining witness credible,” responded public defender River B. Sedaka.

The Court of Appeals panel concluded that Stuart’s reaction did not violate Morgan’s rights under the circumstances.

“To be sure, all agree — including the district court — that the court should not have expressed emotion during the victim’s testimony and that courts must exercise restraint over their conduct,” wrote Dunn. But nothing “shows that the jury — or anyone besides defense counsel — saw the court’s reaction.”

She added that the defense’s decision not to question the jurors meant that no one could determine if corrective action was necessary in the moment.

In the absence of “any indication that the jury saw the court’s emotional reaction to the victim’s testimony, we conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its considerable discretion by denying the mistrial motion,” Dunn wrote.

The case is People v. Morgan.