The Denver-based federal appeals court decided on Monday that the chief of a fire protection district spanning Boulder and Weld counties could not be held liable for terminating a union leader through the process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement.

A trial judge concluded Chief David Beebe of the Niwot-based Mountain View Fire Protection District violated Benjamin Carter’s clear constitutional right to due process by terminating him without a “meaningful” opportunity to challenge Beebe’s decision. Consequently, Beebe was not entitled to qualified immunity, a judicially created shield that prevents public employees from facing civil liability.

However, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit disagreed. Carter, as the lead negotiator on the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the district, had agreed to the termination process that Beebe followed. The panel concluded there was no prior 10th Circuit or U.S. Supreme Court decision that would have put Beebe on notice that he would violate Carter’s constitutional rights by following the collective bargaining agreement.

“And because he has not met his burden of establishing that Chief Beebe violated clearly established constitutional law, Chief Beebe is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Carter’s procedural due process claim,” wrote Judge Scott M. Matheson Jr. in a June 22 order.

The events that triggered Carter’s termination began on Jan. 30, 2023. At the time, Carter was the newly elected president of the union. Although he was not on duty that day, he went to the station to handle gear for new employees. A supplier was making a delivery and mentioned he received a request to remove the American flag from a specific new hire’s protective equipment.

While multiple people noted in statements that the gear did not have the American flag on it to begin with, Carter reportedly became upset and raised the issue with a captain. He learned that the new employee had requested a religious accommodation as a Jehovah’s Witness, and that Beebe approved it.

Carter, who was under the impression he could speak with others about the issue, discussed the religious accommodation with around 14 other employees.

Leadership met on Feb. 6 and decided to investigate Carter’s conduct. The district then placed Carter on administrative leave. The deputy chief spent the month of February investigating and concluded that Carter should be charged with insubordination, the dissemination of confidential information and other misconduct.

Carter responded that he received no instruction to keep the information confidential and that the accusations against him “suspiciously coincide with my recent ascension into the position of elected Union President.”

Carter met with the deputy chief and Beebe, but Beebe terminated Carter in a March 21 letter. He wrote that none of the grounds for termination was “remotely tied to” Carter’s role with the union. He noted that Carter had received training about keeping certain employee information confidential.

Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Carter could appeal to Beebe if there was new information. Carter’s attorneys submitted an appeal, but Beebe denied it on the grounds that it did not contain new information.

Carter then sued, alleging the termination process did not give him an opportunity to be represented by counsel, to review the evidence, to confront his accusers or to meaningfully challenge Beebe’s decision after the fact. He also argued the firing was a result of his speech and union activity.

Both sides moved to end some or all of Carter’s claims in their favor. U.S. District Court Judge Philip A. Brimmer rejected Carter’s claims of speech-related retaliation. However, he agreed with Carter that the necessary procedural safeguards were not in place during the disciplinary process. Specifically, Carter had almost no opportunity to challenge his termination after Beebe’s decision.

The fact that the collective bargaining agreement outlined a certain procedure “does not constitute a waiver of Mr. Carter’s due process rights,” Brimmer wrote.

On appeal, Beebe argued Carter had, in fact, relinquished any additional safeguards in the termination process because of the collective bargaining agreement. Carter countered that he could not waive his right to a meaningful post-termination hearing.

“You don’t have a case that says that piece, correct?” Judge Veronica S. Rossman asked Carter’s attorney during oral arguments.

Ashley Hernandez-Schlagel, representing Beebe, acknowledged that there are court cases that provide “general due process rights,” but the existence of the collective bargaining agreement was a game-changer.

The panel ultimately agreed with her.

“Mr. Carter therefore has not shown that ‘every reasonable official would have understood’ that the CBA, a contractually bargained-for disciplinary procedure, violated the Constitution,” wrote Matheson.

The case is Carter v. Beebe et al.