TAPIEI, Taiwan — The mood here is high, welcoming, and one of industrious contentment, not that of a nation facing an existential military threat. I am here on an official visit (tourists are not yet allowed) organized by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, part of a delegation of scholars, senior political staffers, and economic development types, a distinguished group of which I am by far the dumbest member. Now and then, interspersed between the official meetings and events so graciously organized by my hosts, I have availed myself the opportunity to speak with the man (or woman)-on-the-street, as it were, to gauge the local temperature, which in the meteorological sense is exceedingly hot.

In the geopolitical sense it is somewhat less so. Granted, the sample size is far too small to constitute anything approaching scientific acceptability, but the mood here takes on a character of resigned optimism to what seems to be becoming the new normal (to use the wretched phrase normalized during the early days of COVID) of increased and sustained PRC military activity in the Strait. The people are concerned, of course, but have grown used to it. Red China has been making threats against the island since 1949, and the sense is that worrying won’t change anything; though some have quietly admitted to having a contingency plan under their belt, mostly those lucky enough to have a relative in, say, Japan or the United States.

At the official level things necessarily get a little more complicated. The greatest immediate need is for augmented defensive capability, but the greatest long-term need is for economic security, access to markets, and inclusion in international trade partnerships of the kind that the PRC so desperately strives to exclude them from. Taiwan’s current economic dependence on trade with mainland China puts it in a position not terribly dissimilar to that which Poland found itself with Germany in 1938; or for that matter, that much of Europe faces currently with Russia, at least in terms of energy.

A bilateral trade agreement with the U.S., however beneficial, faces a steep road. The problem is not economic — empirical analysis invariably reveals the benefits that the application of the principle of comparative advantage brings to both sides — but political. There are factors extrinsic to empirical economic analysis which, though more myopic, are nevertheless integral to the question, and it is these which most animate discussions of trade domestically. To get even a relatively simple regional trade agreement like USMC or CAFTA passed, U.S. presidents practically have to promise to pave individual senators’ driveways the next time a highway funding bill comes along. And yet the empirical data and ultimate economic benefits keep the free trade discussion alive, and the strategic and moral obligations to a fellow democracy must yet prevail. Re-engagement in the CPTPP would probably be best; but if that is a bridge too far, then inclusion of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and updated trade promotion authority to pursue a bilateral free trade agreement with Taiwan are in order.

This is the primary international economic question fundamental to the maintenance of Taiwan’s sovereignty. But it does not exist in a vacuum, and other factors are involved. On the defense side, it cannot be overstated that the West’s military commitment to Taiwan’s security must be augmented. The near daily incursions into Taiwanese airspace are slowly, grindingly, taking a toll on Taiwanese men and machines; The ROC Air Force has only around 120 F-16s, meaning the same planes with the same pilots are constantly going up to intercept fresh PLA MiG’s plucked from China’s ample inventory. This cannot continue indefinitely.

And then there is the energy question. Taiwan is almost entirely dependent on imports of energy resources — some coal, but mainly natural gas. This is augmented by an aggressive renewable energy program, but the Taiwanese are realistic about the limitations of renewables (which sets them apart from their colleagues in much of the West, including, notably, Colorado’s entire executive branch). Perhaps the only blindspot the Taiwanese possess, and it is a critical one, is their abandonment of nuclear power. The issue has an internal political dimension, but the current approach must be adjusted if Taiwan is to maintain an energy supply that is not fatally vulnerable to Chinese blockade.

It is tempting to suggest that Taiwan finally just formalize reality, declare independence, and claim the benefits bestowed on independent nations — diplomatic recognition, admission to international organizations, formal military alliances, etc. This approach may have worked 20 years ago, but current circumstances make that a highly risky proposition. Maintenance of the status quo is now the best option, and it is incumbent on the Western democracies to see to that, economically, politically and militarily. In the meantime, one can hold out hope that the government of the PRC goes the way of the government of the Soviet Union, and that future successors to the CCP can do for mainland China what Chiang Kai-shek and his successors, up to and including President Tsai Ing-wen, have done for Taiwan.

Kelly Sloan is a political and public affairs consultant and a recovering journalist based in Denver.