A woman convicted of sexually assaulting a child will receive a new trial after the state’s Court of Appeals determined a Boulder County judge should have dismissed a juror who acknowledged he was more likely to believe children witnesses over adults.

The three-judge panel for the appellate court also decided for the first time that the “rape shield” law, which generally prevents fishing expeditions into a victim or witness’s sexual history, does not prohibit defendants from sharing their own past sexual abuse.

A jury convicted Natalie Gulyas in 2018 on three charges stemming from her sexual relationship with a teenage boy she tutored. Although there was agreement that Gulyas and the victim had intimate contact, Gulyas maintained that the boy had pressured her into a sexual relationship and blackmailed her.

During voir dire, the part of jury selection where the parties ask questions of potential jurors, a man with two young daughters volunteered that his children were “trusting” and “easily trust people.” Gulyas’ lawyer asked Juror R, as he was identified, whether he would side with his daughters if they said they were in a situation similar to the victim’s. He said yes.

“And you feel like would that also be the case if you were serving on a jury and it wasn’t your own kids?” the defense attorney pressed.

“Probably 90% of the time, yeah,” answered Juror R. “I would take the child’s word, the credibility more, probably, than the adult.”

The defense sought to excuse Juror R for cause based on his statements suggesting he would be biased toward believing children over adults. The prosecutor even suggested that District Court Judge Patrick Butler “do some follow-up questioning” with the juror, but Butler ignored the request.

“Certainly, the jury will have to determine what credibility to give to every witness,” he said. The man ended up serving on Gulyas’ jury.

On appeal, Gulyas contended Butler erred by allowing Juror R to serve. The man’s response under questioning was “clear and unequivocal. It’s an extremely strong statement of bias,” argued Deputy State Public Defender Jessica Pitts.

Judge Elizabeth L. Harris, writing for the appellate panel, agreed that an impartial jury is part of a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, and that a juror’s preconceived belief about an aspect of the case is a red flag. Sometimes, through a process known as rehabilitation, a juror can commit to following the law and a judge’s instructions and still be qualified to serve.

But in this case, “Juror R never gave any assurances that he could set aside his clearly expressed bias in favor of child witnesses and follow the court’s instructions,” she wrote in the March 24 opinion. “Juror R’s statements did indicate that, absent some intervention by the court, he was unlikely to impartially evaluate the witnesses’ testimony.”

Addressing an issue that could resurface in Gulyas’ new trial, the panel also agreed that Colorado’s rape shield law does not bar Gulyas from offering evidence about her own history as a sex assault victim. During her original trial, an expert witness testified that victims might “not physically resist” their perpetrators or may not “outwardly express their lack of consent.”

The defense had attempted to introduce information about Gulyas’ own prior sexual assault in response.

Harris explained that the rape shield law is meant to bar inquisitions into the sexual histories of witnesses or victims, and to encourage them to confront alleged perpetrators in sexual assault cases. Gulyas’ attempt to educate the jury about her own abuse was not at odds with those goals.

“Indeed, neither party has cited, nor have we uncovered, any state or federal case construing a rape shield statute to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of her own prior sexual conduct,” Harris wrote.

The panel reversed Gulyas’ convictions. The case is People v. Gulyas.