Choosing to rule on the merits of a defendant’s ineffective counsel claim, the state Supreme Court decided on Monday that a man was correctly advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, even though he claimed his lawyer should have told him about his mandatory detention without bond.

Eswin Ariel Figueroa-Lemus was arrested in October 2012 for possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence. A lawful permanent resident, he pleaded guilty to the controlled substance charge and acknowledged that this action could make him eligible for deportation. Figueroa-Lemus’s defense attorney acknowledged that he and his client talked at length about the immigration consequences of his plea.

“[F]or purposes of immigration,” the attorney recalled, taking a deferred judgment “was the same as if he was pleading guilty straight up.”

Figueroa-Lemus received the deferred sentence, which normally entitles a defendant to dismissal of the case if conditions of the sentence are met. However, shortly afterward, in August 2013, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him. Two months later, Figueroa-Lemus attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he received faulty advice from his lawyer about the fact he would be detained without bond during his deportation proceedings.

The defense attorney admitted that he had not explicitly covered this detail during the discussions with his client, and Figueroa-Lemus said he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about the mandatory detention. An immigration attorney who also consulted with Figueroa-Lemus also acknowledged neglecting to cover the detention aspect.

The trial court in Jefferson County refused to allow the withdrawal of Figueroa-Lemus’s guilty plea, finding that his legal advice was adequate. A Colorado Court of Appeals panel also sided against him.

“Figueroa-Lemus fails to explain how such an advisement would have affected his decision to accept the plea offer if he had been advised that he would be detained before he was deported,” wrote then-Judge Daniel M. Taubman. Judge David Furman wrote separately, believing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

Prosecutors asked the Supreme Court to weigh in on the proper timing of an appeal in the instance of a deferred sentence. The court agreed with Furman’s dissent, that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction until a sentence was imposed and a conviction was formally entered.

Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats referenced the 2012 case of Kazadi v. People, in which the state’s high court determined a defendant could attempt to withdraw his guilty plea prior to the imposition of a sentence by arguing he received ineffective counsel. Like Figueroa-Lemus, the defendant in the 2012 case was also facing deportation as a consequence of the plea. But the court this time disputed that the Kazadi decision entitled Figueroa-Lemus the opportunity to commence his appeal.

Moreover, the justices decided to go one step further and also review Figueroa-Lemus’s allegation of ineffective counsel.

“In Padilla v. Kentucky,” Coats explained, “the United States Supreme Court found that the virtually automatic deportation mandate of existing federal immigration law was a unique consequence of which counsel has an obligation to inform his client before pleading guilty. Where immigration law is less than clear, the Court required counsel to advise his client merely that there may be a risk of adverse immigration consequences, but where the law is ‘succinct and straightforward,’ it required counsel to provide correct advice.”

In this instance, the correct advice was that a guilty plea would lead to deportation, which is what Figueroa-Lemus heard. The court found that the U.S. Supreme Court did not require any advice be given about Figueroa-Lemus’s detention.

“Nothing more concerning the immigration consequences of his plea was required of his counsel,” Coats concluded.

The case is People v. Figueroa-Lemus.