The Colorado Supreme Court pondered the fallout on Tuesday from its nearly six-year-old decision interpreting the state’s impaired driving laws, with the justices now addressing how defendants affected by the legal change must seek postconviction relief.

In contrast to other criminal appeals, there was no dispute that defendant Charles Crabtree could file a motion in the trial court seeking relief from his felony DUI conviction. Two years ago, the Supreme Court explicitly directed him down that path. However, it was unclear what process he should follow to do so, given the strict requirements and pitfalls of postconviction relief.

The sequence of events that brought Crabtree back to the Supreme Court began in November 2020. The Supreme Court interpreted Colorado’s felony DUI law to mean that a person’s prior convictions were no longer something that had to be proven to a judge alone. Rather, a jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the priors existed for a repeat offender to receive a felony conviction.

The change in legal interpretation resulted in scores of felony DUI sentences being overturned. However, in June 2024, the Supreme Court’s majority halted those automatic reversals. It concluded in Crabtree’s case that for situations where the defendant did not object at trial to having a judge weigh their prior convictions — but the law had changed by the time of appeal — the solution was not to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant in the appeal itself.

Instead, the court advised Crabtree to take advantage of a procedural rule allowing people whose appeals are not yet final to file motions for postconviction relief when there is a “significant change in the law.”

After the Supreme Court decided Crabtree’s appeal, but before its decision became final, Crabtree attempted to do what the Supreme Court said he should do. He petitioned a Boulder County judge for postconviction relief on his felony DUI. But the judge denied his motion because the case still remained with the Supreme Court.

Worried that Crabtree could neither file a second motion later nor appeal the judge’s original order if he waited, Crabtree’s attorneys asked the Court of Appeals to review the denial. Yet another snag: The appeals court was unsure what to do with the case and ultimately dismissed the appeal.

Crabtree returned to the Supreme Court once more for the justices to sort out the problem their prior decision had created.

“This court made clear that when a defendant timely invokes (the rule for postconviction relief), our courts ensure a procedure and mechanism that will preserve the claims and reach a merits ruling,” said attorney Britta Kruse during oral arguments, adding that such a decision should either happen while the appeal remains active or after an appellate decision becomes final.

“The Court of Appeals did neither of those things in this case to ensure that Mr. Crabtree could receive an authorized merits ruling,” she said.

The government advocated for allowing trial judges to address a postconviction motion after an appellate decision becomes final or the Court of Appeals gives the go-ahead to rule. Kruse took no issue with that approach, so long as the Supreme Court agreed the rules permit it to happen.

“I would, nine times out of 10, prefer a bright-line rule,” she said. “We want certainty.”

The justices questioned the viability of the various options, including the possibility that two levels of the judiciary might have authority over the case at different times.

“If you have both courts operating at the same time and the Court of Appeals is not required to do a (pause), it feels a little silly to have two courts racing for who’s going to decide the issue first,” said Justice Richard L. Gabriel.

Chief Justice Monica M. Márquez asked Kruse whether her preferred approach — letting trial judges rule on postconviction motions while the appeal remains active — would eliminate the concern that the Court of Appeals might decline to return the case to the trial court to address the postconviction motion.

In that instance, “relief becomes illusory,” said Márquez.

Correct, responded Kruse, and allowing trial judges to address a defendant’s motion automatically is “faithful to the text of the rule.”

The case is Crabtree v. People.