The Colorado Supreme Court recently intervened in the prosecution of a juvenile defendant and will decide whether he is entitled to have prosecutors demonstrate probable cause at a hearing after a grand jury already determined probable cause existed.

The justices also will decide whether a judge correctly ordered a defendant back into jail for a competency evaluation, and whether the 30-day window for challenging a public entity’s issuance of bonds applies to a dispute over a large-scale Commerce City development.

At least four of the court’s seven members must agree to hear a case outside of the normal appeals process.

Probable cause

In April, Larimer County prosecutors obtained a grand jury indictment against five adults allegedly involved in a criminal drugs-and-guns operation to benefit a street gang. The indictment also found probable cause existed for offenses committed by a 17-year-old, identified as A.E.R.

Ordinarily, when a grand jury finds probable cause to indict an adult for a crime, the defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing at which the prosecution must prove probable cause exists to bring the defendant to trial.

The prosecution argued that A.E.R. was not entitled to a preliminary hearing because, even though the indictment was not directed at him, there was still a finding of “probable cause by an independent body through a different, but just as reliable mechanism.”

The defense believed otherwise.

“Adult criminal proceedings can be initiated by a grand jury indictment, because the adult criminal rules and procedures specifically allow this. Where an adult criminal proceeding is initiated through a grand jury indictment, a defendant does not also have a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing,” wrote A.E.R.’s attorney. “However, juvenile delinquency proceedings cannot be initiated by a grand jury indictment, because the juvenile delinquency rules and procedures do not allow this.”

District Court Judge Joseph D. Findley agreed that A.E.R. was not entitled to a hearing on probable cause, as “the purpose of a preliminary hearing has been accomplished by the grand jury indictment.”

The defense turned to the Supreme Court, arguing no prior case answered the question of A.E.R.’s entitlement to a preliminary hearing under the circumstances.

“Because a grand jury indictment is not a legally recognized procedure for commencing a juvenile delinquency proceeding, any indictment returned by a grand jury has no legal effect on the juvenile proceeding,” wrote A.E.R.’s lawyers. “Therefore, the existence of a grand jury indictment cannot alter or diminish the procedural rights afforded to a juvenile.”

The Supreme Court ordered a response to the defense’s petition.

The case is People in the Interest of A.E.R.

Competency evaluation

Pueblo County prosecutors charged Dalton Rincon in April 2024 with assaulting two sheriff’s deputies. Quickly, his lawyer raised concerns that Rincon was unable to “perceive, relate, and process information,” and requested a competency evaluation.

Rincon remained incarcerated for months while a psychologist determined he was incompetent to proceed and likely required treatment in custody. In April 2025, another evaluator found Rincon remained incompetent and recommended antipsychotic medicine.

Then, in August 2025, the original psychologist determined Rincon was now competent to proceed in his case. Three days later, Rincon posted bond and was released from jail.

However, his lawyer once again raised concerns about Rincon’s mental ability to participate in his case, and asked for another competency evaluation. A third evaluator agreed Rincon lacked competency, and opined that psychiatric treatment could occur out of custody.

At a Dec. 17 hearing before District Court Judge Thomas Flesher, the prosecution did not object to the evaluator’s findings or recommendation. Yet, Flesher was “not comfortable” that Rincon would abide by the treatment plan out of custody.

“I appreciate the fact that Mr. Rincon has been coming to court and respectfully staying out of trouble, but I believe inpatient restoration is the appropriate way to go here,” he said in ordering Rincon back to jail.

Rincon’s lawyer quickly withdrew and his new public defender asked Flesher to reconsider, citing the portion of Colorado law requiring judges to order out-of-custody competency restoration services unless an evaluator recommends otherwise. Flesher declined to modify his order.

Rincon then sought the Supreme Court’s intervention.

“The Colorado legislature has made it clear that the trial court does not have boundless authority to incarcerate individuals at will, without limitation, simply because findings are made about an individual’s ability to understand the legal procedures of a criminal case,” wrote public defender Alexander G. Brock. “To incarcerate anyone who is found incompetent to proceed places individuals with a history of mental health concerns in a jail which exacerbates those health concerns and cruelly subjects them to undue hardships.”

The Supreme Court directed Flesher and the district attorney’s office to respond.

The case is People v. Rincon.

Special district bonds

There are roughly 2,800 special districts in Colorado, which are local governments that perform specific functions within a geographic area. Most are metropolitan districts, which can finance new infrastructure.

In 2000, the Reunion Metropolitan District formed in Commerce City to facilitate a 3,100-acre mixed-use development. Reunion was the “service district,” meaning it would construct and manage the public improvements, and a handful of other districts would finance the project over time.

In 2016, the entities entered into the Mill Levy Equalization and Pledge Agreement, which they amended the following year to authorize Reunion to issue $21.6 million in bonds for debt related to the development.

Then, in 2022, two of the financing districts sought to invalidate the agreement. Reunion filed suit in Adams County to enforce the agreement. It moved to dismiss the financing districts’ claim of invalidity by citing the Supplemental Public Securities Act, a state law that prohibits challenges to the issuance of securities after 30 days. “Securities” encompass financial contracts, notes, and bonds issued by a public entity.

“The Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument that the Mill Levy Equalization and Pledge Agreement (‘MLEPA’) constitutes a financial contract connected to the issuance of traditional security instruments,” wrote District Court Judge Toni J. Wehman in declining to dismiss the financing districts’ challenge. “The Court is not persuaded, however, that the legislature intended the term ‘security’ under the Act to encompass the MLEPA.”

She added that, in her view, the agreement was an intergovernmental arrangement for the provision of services, and that the 30-day challenge window did not apply.

After Wehman declined to let Reunion seek immediate Court of Appeals review, Reunion turned to the Supreme Court to argue that her interpretation would have significant implications for the $8 billion debt carried by special districts under similar agreements.

The Metro District Education Coalition, the Special District Association of Colorado, the Colorado Municipal Bond Dealers Association and other groups also urged the Supreme Court to step in and prevent disruption to existing publicly financed projects.

The securities act “has served as a necessary source of certainty for these transactions: public entities can work with each other and the finance market to promote growth and development, so long as investors know the transactions — including, critically, the underlying pledge agreements between financing governments and issuers — are beyond challenge,” the groups argued.

The Supreme Court directed the financing districts to respond.

The case is Reunion Metropolitan District et al. v. North Range Metropolitan District No. 1 et al.