A federal judge concluded last week that a man cannot sue the government for injuries he sustained when a dog allegedly attacked him while he participated in a prison program.

Kenneth M. Chandler, representing himself, was participating in the “FIDOS” program at the federal penitentiary in Littleton in June 2024. While he was training his own dog, another unmuzzled dog who was new to the program allegedly attacked Chandler. He suffered scarring and physical and emotional pain.

Chandler filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which permits lawsuits for money damages against the United States in certain circumstances. However, the government argued that Chandler could not pursue such a claim because he could only obtain compensation through a workers’ comp-like program, the Inmate Accident Compensation Act.

As described by law professor Andrea C. Armstrong in a 2021 article, the IACA allows for compensation for “lost-time wages.” Any payments for the injuries themselves are only made after the injured party is released from prison.

“Moreover, there is an absolute bar to recovery of compensation if the incarcerated worker fully recovered while in custody and there is no longer any impairment at their time of release,” wrote Armstrong.

Chandler responded to the government’s motion to dismiss by disputing that he was participating at the time of his injury in “any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution,” as the IACA requires.

“The FIDOS Program contract repeatedly refers to the program as a ‘volunteer program,'” he wrote.

Before deciding the motion, U.S. Magistrate Judge Cyrus Y. Chung asked the government to explain why the dog-training program was “in connection with the maintenance or operation of” the prison. He also wondered whether “any prison work assignments would not be covered by that statutory language.”

The program “is connected to the orderly operation” of the prison, responded Assistant U.S. Attorney Erika A. Kelley, “because it reduces inmate idleness and keeps participating inmates constructively occupied.”

She attached a statement from the FIDOS program coordinator who said that, to her knowledge, she was unaware of any work assignment at Chandler’s prison that was not subject to the IACA.

In a Jan. 13 order, Chung agreed with the government that Chandler had to file a workers’ comp-style claim, rather than pursue a lawsuit for damages. He also acknowledged the difficulty of any prisoner being able to successfully sue for the type of injuries Chandler sustained.

“Most, if not all, prison work assignments would be ‘connected’ to the operation of the institution in the same ways. Indeed, the defendant admits that it is unaware of any work assignment not falling under IACA’s umbrella, raising a question of whether such a broad interpretation of ‘operation’ runs counter to the principle that a court is ‘to give meaning to every word of a statute where possible’,” wrote Chung. “But the statute’s breadth appears to have been part of Congress’s design.”

He concluded the dog-training initiative was a work program and that Chandler’s injuries were governed by the IACA. Therefore, Chandler could not sue the government.

The case is Chandler v. United States of America.