The Colorado Supreme Court waded into a split that developed in the state’s second-highest court, clarifying on Monday that prosecutors do not need to prove a defendant intended specifically for a child to be prostituted in order to secure a conviction.

Under Colorado law, soliciting for child prostitution is an offense that requires someone to knowingly seek out someone or arrange a meeting “for the purpose of” child prostitution.

In 2019, a three-judge Court of Appeals panel broke with a prior interpretation of the law and concluded “for the purpose of” meant a defendant had to specifically intend for child prostitution — as opposed to adult prostitution — to happen. Then-Chief Judge Steve Bernard reasoned that requiring prosecutors to prove a defendant’s intent was meaningful because defendants cannot rely on their belief that the child was actually 18 or older.

“The jury could have rationally acquitted defendant of the greater offense of soliciting for child prostitution if it had found that he did not intend to solicit a child. And the jury could have rationally found him guilty of the lesser offense of soliciting for prostitution,” Bernard wrote.

Although the Supreme Court reviewed that case, People v. Ross, it issued a decision on other grounds and left “for another day” the question of a defendant’s intent.

Fast-forwarding to 2023, a different Court of Appeals panel concluded Ross was wrongly decided. Specifically, it believed the judges in Ross misread the phrase “for the purpose of” to require proof a defendant intended for child prostitution, specifically, to happen. In reality, wrote Judge Ted C. Tow III, the law meant what it said: that a defendant is guilty if he knowingly seeks out someone or arranges a meeting for the purpose of child prostitution.

In the underlying case, an Arapahoe County sheriff’s employee posed as a teenage girl on a social networking platform for people 18 and older. Deshawn Lynn Randolph came across the girl’s profile and began messaging, then texting, her. He asked if she was “down to get naked” and said he had “money lined up for you” to have sex.

The girl, “Nicole,” disclosed she was a few days shy of turning 18. Although Randolph and Nicole never actually met as planned, police eventually went to Randolph’s job and arrested him. A jury convicted him of soliciting for child prostitution and he received nine years in prison.

District Court Judge Ryan J. Stuart reasoned a defendant’s specific intent did not matter, raising the example of a man who arranges to have sex with a child and promises her money but plans to not follow through on the payment.

“Because he never intended to pay her, his purpose of the meeting was not prostitution; his purpose was to have sex and not pay for it,” Stuart explained, noting the prosecution would consequently not be able to prove a prostitution offense. “This could not be the result the legislature intended.”

On appeal, Randolph challenged whether the prosecution had proven its case, but the Court of Appeals sided against him.

“Here, it simply cannot be said that the prosecution’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Randolph solicited ‘Nicole’ for the purpose of child prostitution,” wrote public defender Andrea R. Gammell to the Supreme Court. “Rather, the evidence established, at best, that Randolph was interested in meeting ‘Nicole’ for sex, and at worst, that he solicited her for the purpose of adult prostitution.”

In its June 23 opinion, the Supreme Court agreed the law did not require prosecutors to prove a defendant intended for child prostitution, as opposed to adult prosecution, to happen. Justice Carlos A. Samour Jr., who wrote the court’s prior opinion in the Ross case, explained “for the purpose of” is not a recognized mental state standing alone.

“In sum, to be guilty of soliciting for child prostitution, an offender must act knowingly — i.e., be ‘aware of what he is doing’ — in soliciting another for the purpose of prostitution of or by a child,” Samour wrote.

The case is Randolph v. People.