“Did you ever hear the tragedy of the ‘trusted build?'” one man asked. “No,” the other replied.

“I thought not. It’s not something the Establishment would tell you.”

This parody of a scene in Star Wars: Revenge of the Sith captures the narrative spun by some election conspiracists about a cryptic part of Colorado’s election system: the “trusted build.”

As I wrote August 20, the trusted build (TB) is “a brand-new installation of voting system software such as Dominion or Clear Ballot consisting of enhancements and new security features, often required by law.”

The TB has become central to the controversies entangling County Clerks Tina Peters (Mesa) and Dallas Schroeder (Elbert). Consequently, both fair questions and conspiracy theories have arisen from the apparent mystery of the TB.

In fact, there is no mystery. This isn’t an “Establishment plot.”

Allow me to remove the veil and get into the weeds.

During a county’s TB process, representatives from the Secretary of State and county clerk offices and the vendor (Dominion or Clear Ballot) are present. Windows is freshly installed on the election computers, meaning all preexisting data is supplanted and logs are deleted. Then, the latest voting system software/firmware (the TB) is installed.

For his part, Schroeder made copies of Elbert County’s election hard drives on Aug. 26, 2021. “He believes that he has a statutory duty to preserve election records for 25 months after an election,” a court filing last week explained. “This duty includes preserving electronic election records that are stored on the server. Plaintiff was concerned that the ‘trusted build,’ which was scheduled for Aug. 27, 2021, might erase or alter electronic records of the November 2020 election that were stored on the Elbert County election server.”

This is a head-scratcher. The fact that the TB accompanies a fresh Windows OS installation that wipes the hard drive was public information. My August 2021 column – wherein I discussed exactly this – was published six days before Schroeder imaged Elbert County’s election hard drives.

As I noted in September, the Colorado County Clerks Association calls this “by design.” It also follows the law. Before the new TB is installed, the county and state must back-up all election records. These backups ensure compliance with state retention laws requiring election records be maintained for 25 months.

Moreover, as El Paso County Clerk Chuck Broerman said last year, “Each county retains the voted paper ballots from each election for 25 months after each election as well. Those records allow a county, if necessary, to recreate the election, recount ballots and audit the accuracy of the system in tabulating the ballots. These records and the ability to recreate an election ensure compliance with federal and state election retention laws.”

Windows log files and activity logs are irrelevant. They aren’t included or implied in the definition of “election records” that clerks are required to maintain, either. Additionally, the process expressly complies with federal law and guidance under the 2002 Voting System Standards passed by Congress and the 2021 “Federal Law Constraints on Post-Election ‘Audits'” by the U.S. Department of Justice.

The 2002 standards in part define “voting system” as “the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used.”

The SOS office maintains copies of trusted builds – the software and firmware – from previous Colorado elections. Every county – including Elbert and Mesa – should possess every election project or database version for at least 25 months after each election, including the 2020 general election project.

This enables election officials to reinstall the relevant TB, upload the appropriate election project into the program and recount ballot images or even the paper ballots themselves as if it was, say, 2020.

DOJ’s guidance further ensures compliance with “retain(ing) and preserv(ing)” “(f)ederal election records” under the Civil Rights Act of 1960. Required materials “extend beyond ‘papers’ to include other ‘records'” both “created in digital or electronic form.” This clearly covers the pertinent TB and election project – not superfluous activity logs.

Even so, election officials can and have copied activity logs. For example, following the 2020 elections, Larimer Clerk Angela Myers spoke with an SOS staffer and, after consulting her own team, Myers decided to back-up activity logs from Larimer election computers. Larimer Elections staff had done this before. It’s not required, but Myers did it properly – and without imaging hard drives.

Following the 2020 presidential election, Schroeder – an experienced county clerk since 2013 – conducted a hand recount in his county. He found Elbert was just three votes off because of misinterpreted voter intent. Hand recounts are a surefire way to verify results on top of the state’s annual risk-limiting audits. Other clerks should have followed Schroeder’s lead.

So, was there a compelling reason to doubt the hand recount Schroeder himself implemented? (I emailed him several related questions but haven’t heard back by deadline).

Regardless, perhaps clerks should back up activity logs as a best practice. Maybe the SOS should develop a process for clerks to properly image and store hard drives. These steps may be immaterial and unrequired by law, but perhaps they’re good ideas. That’s not the issue here.

The real problem is how surreptitious activity regarding election hard drives has triggered unnecessary doubts and generated misbeliefs among some Coloradans over a seemingly convoluted process that is, honestly, easily explained. Sometimes, it’s best to let Occam’s razor be your guide.

Jimmy Sengenberger is host of “The Jimmy Sengenberger Show” Saturdays from 6-9am on News/Talk 710 KNUS.  He also hosts “Jimmy at the Crossroads,” a webshow and podcast in partnership with The Washington Examiner.