An Adams County judge did not make a mistake when he left jurors without a definition of “universal malice” – a phrase state law does not define and that no other state apparently uses in its own murder laws, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled on Monday.

The jury that convicted Cristobal Fernando Garcia of attempted extreme indifference murder needed to find Garcia acted with “an attitude of universal malice,” showing extreme indifference to the value of human life. The Supreme Court believed universal malice is not a “technical term” that automatically needs a definition and, in context, jurors would understand what it meant.

At the same time, Justice William W. Hood III quietly suggested a definition of the phrase, should trial judges in the future find it necessary.

“Instead, if a trial court does provide a definition of ‘universal malice,’ the better practice would be to define the term to include ‘a willingness to take life indiscriminately’,” he wrote in the June 5 opinion.

In Garcia’s underlying case, he fired a gun in the direction of his girlfriend and her sister in public. Neither woman was injured. At trial, Garcia’s lawyers asked Chief Judge Don Quick to tell jurors that universal malice was “that depravity of the human heart which determines to take life upon slight or insufficient provocation,” without caring who might get hurt.

Quick declined to provide the definition. Garcia’s jurors never asked the judge to clarify the meaning of universal malice before their guilty verdict.

The Court of Appeals agreed that because the jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law, and essentially told jurors that Garcia needed to act with a willingness to do unjustified harm, Quick’s choice not to define the phrase was reasonable.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Garcia argued jurors’ precise understanding of the elements of a crime is necessary to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Had jurors received a definition, they might have found Garcia guilty of a less serious crime than attempted murder. Moreover, no other state’s murder laws talk about universal malice.

“Common sense dictates that the term ‘universal malice’ does not have a common understanding among the general population,” argued Deputy Public Defender Joseph P. Hough. “Without going to the case law, there’s no way I could recite a proper, accurate and full definition of the term ‘universal malice,’ and it’s unreasonable to expect lay jurors to be able to do so.”

The Colorado Attorney General’s Office responded that judges should not define universal malice unless jurors indicate they are confused.

The Supreme Court recognized the outcome might be different had Garcia’s jurors asked about the meaning of universal malice. However, Hood wrote, the court has never required trial judges to give an automatic definition. With the understanding that universal malice means “a willingness to take life indiscriminately,” the instructions for Garcia’s jury gave enough context to communicate that idea. 

“Thus, even if there could be confusion about ‘universal malice’ as a standalone term, the complete statutory phrase lends clarity,” Hood wrote.

The case is Garcia v. People.