A Broomfield County judge did not have the legal authority to extend an order prohibiting the defendant from harassing his victims after the man was acquitted by reason of insanity, Colorado’s second-highest court ruled last week.

Nicholas James Licata brutally killed his father and assaulted his partner in January 2019. Two evaluations found Licata was legally insane at the time of the murder. Consequently, a judge concluded Licata was not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him indefinitely to the state’s mental hospital.

However, Chief Judge Don Quick also extended for an additional 99 years a mandatory protection order that covered Licata’s partner and child. Licata argued Quick had no authority to do so because Colorado law terminates mandatory protection orders, also known as restraining orders, when there is an acquittal – and courts have long equated not guilty by reason of insanity with acquittal.

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with Licata.

The law “makes no distinction between an acquittal resulting from an NGRI verdict and one resulting from a not guilty verdict, and we may not add language to the statute,” wrote Judge Rebecca R. Freyre in the panel’s April 20 opinion.

In criminal cases, courts impose mandatory protection orders that prohibit defendants from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against or tampering with any witness or victim “until final disposition of the action.” An acquittal counts as a “final disposition.”

After a 2020 trial in which Quick acquitted Licata of murdering his father, assaulting his partner and child abuse by reason of insanity, the judge extended the mandatory protection order that covered Licata’s surviving victims for 99 more years.

Licata challenged the extension and the prosecution admitted that his insanity-based acquittal required Quick to terminate the protection order. The district attorney’s office maintained that Colorado law “fails to appreciate and account for the circumstance at hand,” calling it a “glaring hole” in the law.

Quick noted that he still had jurisdiction over Licata’s mental health commitment. Further, he said, “I think there is a difference in this case of a victim where there’s been a not guilty verdict versus a victim in a case where the Court found all the acts occurred – there was just a question of culpability due to the mental health state of the defendant.”

Ultimately, Quick ruled the mandatory protection order could be extended because a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is “specific and unique,” and is not a final disposition under Colorado law.

Licata turned to the Court of Appeals, claiming Quick’s erroneous reading of the law inflicted harm upon him.

Licata “anticipates a future time when his doctors will recommend resumed contact with his child – and that would also promote his treatment and recovery,” wrote attorney Christopher Estoll.

The Court of Appeals affirmed that not guilty by reason of insanity amounts to an acquittal, meaning Quick could not extend the mandatory protection order. If lawmakers wanted to treat insanity-based acquittals differently, Freyre wrote, they could have done so.

“And it is certainly within the General Assembly’s authority to amend” the law, she continued, “but we may not usurp that lawmaking prerogative by adding an exception to the MPO statute that is not there.”

Freyre added that Licata’s victims could still pursue a civil protection order, even though the process is more “burdensome” and requires proof of imminent danger.

The case is People v. Licata.