Colorado’s second-highest court has ordered an Arapahoe County judge to reconsider her decision to slash a jury’s $33 million verdict to just $436,070 against a man who was speeding at 99 mph before he ran a red light and killed another motorist.

Although District Court Judge Elizabeth Volz applied the monetary cap on jury awards that exists in state law, she was authorized to lift the cap if defendant Sherozjon Vahobov had committed a “felonious killing” of 30-year-old Justin Gorodess. Last week, a three-judge panel for the Court of Appeals disagreed with Volz’s conclusion that Vahobov’s dangerous driving behavior could not fit the definition of a felonious killing.

“Traffic offenses like excessive speed and failure to obey traffic signals may, depending on the circumstances, support a finding of a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” wrote Judge Christina F. Gomez in the panel’s Oct. 20 opinion.

On Sept. 1, 2019, Vahobov was speeding at 99 mph down Yosemite St. near the border of Denver and Arapahoe County. The speed limit was 35 mph. At the ramp with Interstate 225, Gorodess proceeded into the intersection on a green light. Vahobov, who had managed to slow to around 55 mph, slammed into Gorodess, killing him.

Prosecutors charged Vahobov with vehicular manslaughter, but he reportedly fled to his home country of Uzbekistan during the criminal proceedings. Instead, Gorodess’ mother took Vahobov to trial on a civil claim of wrongful death. Vahobov did not appear at the trial, and the jury found him liable for Gorodess’ death. Jurors awarded Gorodess’ mother $33 million for noneconomic damages, which can include emotional distress and suffering.

Colorado law places a limit on noneconomic damages, but there is an exception if the wrongful death amounts to a felonious killing. To fit that definition, a defendant must have a conviction of murder or manslaughter in a criminal case, which did not apply to Vahobov.

Regardless of any criminal proceedings, however, if a trial judge determines it is more likely than not that a defendant’s behavior amounts to manslaughter, the judge can also deem the wrongful death to be a felonious killing.

The lawyer for Gorodess’ mother requested that Volz find Vahobov committed a felonious killing, asserting there was sufficient evidence Vahobov acted recklessly, as manslaughter requires. But Volz disagreed.

“In this case we have almost no information about what Mr. Vehobov (sic) was aware of at the time of the collision,” she wrote, “although the fact that he substantially reduced his speed just prior to entering the intersection indicates that it is quite possible that Defendant might have been speeding up to ‘make the light’ and then slammed on his brakes when the light turned red.”

If true, that would not mean Vahobov acted recklessly, Volz believed. Speeding and running a red light, she added, could not alone suggest manslaughter was an issue.

“To hold otherwise would mean that every time there is an automobile collision which involves the violation of the traffic laws and that collision results in a death, the incident must be deemed a ‘felonious killing’,” Volz wrote. “Such an analysis would apply in almost every traffic accident case.”

She then refused to reconsider her ruling and hold a hearing on the evidence, insisting she “properly analyzed the facts.” 

On appeal, Anthony Viorst, representing the plaintiff, argued Volz was incorrect to conclude the circumstances of Gorodess’ death could not be a felonious killing because they were like “almost every traffic accident.”

“Even if he was ‘gunning it’ and trying to make the red light, so what? He could still be reckless,” Viorst said of the defendant.

The Colorado Trial Lawyers Association wrote to the Court of Appeals to echo Viorst’s position, observing that the act of traveling 99 mph down a 35 mph road was inherently unreasonable and deadly. The Colorado Defense Lawyers Association also submitted a brief, cautioning the court against “expanding” the felonious killing exception to all motor vehicle fatalities.

Judge Elizabeth L. Harris took issue during oral arguments with Volz’s belief that if Gorodess’ killing was reckless, all traffic accidents were reckless. That conclusion, Harris observed, was “not true.”

“No one was saying, ‘Every time somebody drives over the speed limit or runs a red light, that’s reckless conduct.’ Nobody was saying that,” Harris said. “Maybe she needs to reconsider because that second part is not true and it seems to be driving the quasi-factual finding that these things are not a substantial risk.”

The appellate panel ultimately decided Volz should have held a hearing to determine whether the evidence established Vahobov committed a felonious killing. The plaintiff, explained Gomez, was willing to offer several types of testimony, plus an animation of the accident, to show how Vahobov’s behavior amounted to recklessness.

“And, contrary to the trial court’s concern,” she wrote, echoing Harris’ critique, “a finding that this standard is satisfied under the circumstances of a particular case doesn’t signify that the same finding would be required under other circumstances involving more minor infractions.”

The case is Gorodess v. Vahobov.