The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on Monday that defendants serving lengthy sentences under the state’s “three strikes” law, and whose convictions have been final for years or decades, do not have the opportunity to argue their punishments are excessive under current standards.

Although Colorado’s Habitual Criminal Act has undergone changes since its enactment nearly a century ago, the basic framework remains the same: A person convicted of multiple prior felonies will receive a much harsher sentence for a repeat offense than they would otherwise.

Recently, two defendants who received habitual sentences in the 1990s mounted a challenge thanks to a 2019 ruling that they believed had thrown them a lifeline.

That year, the Supreme Court handed down a major ruling, Wells-Yates v. People, which recognized “grossly disproportionate” sentences are unconstitutional. Therefore, judges must take certain factors into account when they review the proportionality of a defendant’s sentence, including the seriousness of the conduct, the harshness of the penalty and whether changes in law have lessened the penalties for defendants going forward.

The open question, though, was whether Wells-Yates was a purely procedural decision affecting how judges look at sentences, or whether it actually altered the scope of conduct or persons the state can punish. If the latter were true, it would entitle defendants with already-final convictions to a sentencing review.

The Supreme Court concluded it was not the case that years-old habitual sentences were now open to scrutiny.

Justice William W. Hood III, writing in the pair of Dec. 16 opinions, acknowledged Wells-Yates did introduce new components to sentencing reviews — specifically, the directive to consider legislative changes to criminal laws and removing drug crimes from the category of offenses always deemed serious.

However, he elaborated, the court’s new rules were not “substantive,” meaning they did not suddenly put certain defendants beyond the state’s power to punish. 

“Wells-Yates didn’t remove any range of conduct or class of individuals from the possibility of habitual criminal sentencing,” Hood wrote. “No one who was sentenced under the habitual criminal statute before Wells-Yates was ineligible for such sentencing after Wells-Yates.”

Originally, the Habitual Criminal Act imposed life imprisonment for someone with prior felony convictions, on the belief that “genetic criminals” should be sterilized or segregated from society. In 1993, the legislature replaced that punishment with a sentence of either three or four times the maximum, depending upon how many prior felonies a person had. The priors are known as “predicate” offenses and the crime that prompts the habitual sentence is the “triggering” offense.

An El Paso County jury convicted Rodney Dewayne McDonald in 1996 of attempted murder, with two prior drug and menacing convictions as the predicate offenses. He received 72 years in prison. Four years earlier, Denver jurors convicted David L. Ward of aggravated robbery. Because he had three prior felonies — and the legislature had not yet amended the Habitual Criminal Act — he received a life sentence.

Although defendants typically have a limited window to seek postconviction relief, both men petitioned for a review of their sentences’ proportionality after Wells-Yates. The Court of Appeals turned them aside, reasoning Wells-Yates only spoke to the procedure judges should use going forward.

Turning to the Supreme Court, McDonald noted both of his predicate offenses from the ’90s would no longer subject him to the Habitual Criminal Act if committed today. Ward argued the legislature had since abandoned life sentences for defendants in his shoes.

Among other concerns, however, the justices wondered if decades-old sentences would be subject to scrutiny every time lawmakers reduce a penalty.

“The legislature continually changes our criminal laws. Wells-Yates cannot be used as a mechanism for perpetual review of a sentence,” argued Assistant Solicitor General Jessica E. Ross during oral arguments in October.

In the court’s opinions, Hood explained that any new mandate the Supreme Court imposed when conducting sentencing reviews did not change who was eligible for punishment as a habitual criminal.

“Rather, it simply reminded courts to consider society’s evolving views on the gravity or seriousness of certain crimes,” he explained.

Because Wells-Yates was procedural in nature, the court concluded McDonald and Ward could not challenge their long-final sentences.

The cases are McDonald v. People and Ward v. People.