A federal judge upheld Colorado’s individual campaign contribution limits as constitutional on Thursday, finding that three Republican plaintiffs failed to prove the campaign finance framework violates their First Amendment rights.

U.S. District Court Senior Judge John L. Kane recognized that Colorado’s limitations on individual contributions to state political candidates are among the lowest in the country. Moreover, periodic adjustments to the caps have lagged behind inflation.

However, Kane wrote in a March 26 order that Colorado voters legitimately enacted the limits to guard against “quid pro quo” corruption, and they do not prevent political challengers from mounting successful campaigns.

“Therefore, they do not violate the political expression and association rights of candidates or contributors that are guaranteed by the First Amendment,” wrote Kane, a Jimmy Carter appointee.

The lawsuit was filed more than four years ago by now-Sen. Rod Pelton, R-Cheyenne Wells; Steve House, a former state Republican Party chair; and Greg Lopez, a past and current candidate for governor who served for six months as a Republican congressman in 2024. An attorney for the plaintiffs did not respond to a request for comment.

“We are glad this case is resolved, and will continue to uphold the state’s campaign finance laws,” said Jack Todd, a spokesperson for Secretary of State Jena Griswold, who was named as a defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged that Article 28, which voters approved as a state constitutional amendment in 2002, set contribution limits to political candidates so low that they violate the First Amendment and federal court precedent. Although complex, there were two key parts of Article 28 in dispute.

First, the constitution places dollar caps on how much a candidate can receive from a single contributor in a primary and general election cycle, now amounting to $1,450 for “Tier 1” candidates running for statewide office and $450 for “Tier 2” offices, including state legislative seats.

Second, if a candidate opts to voluntarily restrict the total money spent on their campaign, they are eligible to collect donations in twice those amounts from individuals. The limits vary between offices, with only candidates for governor and lieutenant governor being able to exceed $1 million.

Kane declined to block enforcement of the limits shortly after the plaintiffs filed suit. He decided at the time that several factors weighed in favor of the government. For example, there was no apparent disadvantage to challengers from Article 28’s donation limits. Political parties are able to donate substantially higher amounts to candidates. And while the caps for legislative candidates had almost never experienced an inflationary increase since 2002, Article 28 does permit the caps to rise.

Kane then held a multiday trial in July 2024. He heard testimony from the plaintiffs, other elected officials, and expert witnesses who attempted to quantify the relationship between campaign contribution limits and electoral competitiveness.

Although several witnesses told Kane that they were unaware of any instances of quid pro quo corruption in Colorado related to individual campaign contributions, former Sen. Kerry Donovan, D-Vail, testified that an interest group attempted to sway her by putting money figuratively on the table.

“During their candidate interview, they asked me directly how I would vote on a hypothetical bill that would likely come up in the next session, and then directly implied that their endorsement and subsequent financial support hinged on my answer to that question,” she said. “I did not have to infer anything in this. It was basically like, ‘Your vote on this bill is this money.'”

In his order, Kane wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court has found that spending money in connection with politics is a constitutionally protected activity. While the court’s reasoning involved the importance of a robust debate over ideas, “in the digital age, their means of protection may need to be reconsidered,” Kane added.

He concluded the contribution limits served a permissible purpose in preventing corruption.

“From this history, it is easily inferred that the contribution limits were adopted because the public believed that the previously set higher limits for individual contributions presented opportunities for abuse,” he wrote.

In turning to the relatively small caps, Kane noted the Supreme Court has recognized “danger signs” for contribution limits if they are substantially lower than what other states have enacted or lower than what the court has previously upheld. To evaluate the constitutionality of those limits, courts employ the “Randall factors,” named for the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Randall v. Sorrell that invalidated Vermont’s campaign finance act based on its unjustifiably low contribution limits.

Based on the evidence, Kane did not find that the limits harmed the ability of challengers to mount campaigns against incumbents. He also reiterated that political parties themselves are able to contribute to candidates in far greater amounts, should they choose to do so. Further, the limits largely do not apply to volunteers performing campaign duties.

As for the fourth Randall factor, Kane noted his “genuine concern” about the way Colorado’s campaign finance framework accounts for inflation. Although the caps are adjusted every four years, the mechanism for rounding down has resulted in almost no increase for “Tier 2” candidates, and an understated increase for “Tier 1” candidates over the years.

“If I were in the business of policymaking, the indexing mechanism … might not be the one I would use,” wrote Kane. “It is, however, the mechanism that Colorado voters chose in this context.”

He added that candidates in Colorado appear able to fundraise adequately, so the limits are “within the constitutionally acceptable range.”

The case is Lopez et al. v. Griswold et al.