It being something of a tradition of mine (and I am ever bound by tradition) to pen my inaugural column of the new year as a tour of sorts of the world scene, let’s begin:

We begin in Europe, by which of course we mean Ukraine. It’s fair to say we seem closer to a resolution of that conflict, but it appears to be rather asymptotic; we get closer, but never quite actually there. President Donald Trump periodically seems he is starting to get it — that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been playing him and has no intention of dealing honestly, and that his ambitions are more aggressively extrinsic than Russian state propaganda would have one believe. But this clarity never seems to last long.

Part of the issue is that no one in the administration has as yet outlined what peace in Ukraine — one that would be in the American interest — ought to look like. What it ought to look like is Ukraine regaining all, or at least most, of its pre-invasion territory, and a pathway to NATO membership as a way to contain an irredentist Russia. There are potentially acceptable variations to this model; for instance, Kyiv gets some of its territory back, joins NATO, and the easternmost lands serving as a demilitarized buffer under international supervision. In any case, a clear policy, with the containment of Russia as the ultimate goal, needs to be delineated.

One secondary aspect to the Ukraine conflict has been the awakening of western Europe from its decades-long daydream, and their realization that their survival depends on rearming and taking defense seriously. Much of this is due, no doubt, to Trump’s thinly veiled threats of leaving our erstwhile allies hanging if push comes to Russian tanks knocking on Warsaw’s door. Abandoning Europe would, for a dozen reasons, be foolish, but increased UK/European self-reliance is, obviously, a welcome development. The delivery of the message may have been rather unseemly, but if it produced the desired effect…

Things are going more smoothly, for the time being, in the Middle East, by which of course we mean Israel/Gaza. Trump’s foreign policy has been far more clear-eyed in that region than it has in eastern Europe, and the result has been a cease fire, which is holding for now. Hamas, and other groups like it, still periodically break the ceasefire, and the IDF slaps them down, but on the whole, it is relatively quiet. Enough so that you have to hunt a bit for any mention of Israel is the news these days, and part of that is because sprouting up in the aftermath has been the exposure of just how bad much of the reporting was on the conflict, and just how wrong most of the world’s media got it. It turns out that perhaps Hamas were the bad guys after all. Who would have thunk?

The other part of the Middle East equation is Iran, which earlier this year found itself on the unfortunate side of what may be Trump’s greatest foreign policy success, next to brokering the Gaza peace (assuming that lasts). The strike which decapitated Tehran’s nuclear weapons program fulfilled a key American national security objective and was instrumental in paving the way to the Gaza deal. But Iran’s surviving leadership is still there, still radical, and still hates everyone. Trump rightly raised the specter of renewed strikes should a resurrection of the A-bomb program be detected. And the mass protests in the wretched country may offer another opportunity if we have the will and capacity to seize it. This, again, requires a clearly defined policy to guide us in the region.

The new theatre in our tour is the Caribbean, by which of course we mean Venezuela. I have commented on the issue in this space recently, so it will herewith summarize: the messaging needs to greatly improve, and the legal aspects of the various operations conclusively sorted out, but the cause, reasons for which have been insufficiently delineated, is just, and represents a valid national security enterprise. The administration needs to level with the people, and Congress, as to what the ultimate goal is, and Congress needs to get on board to make sure that legitimate national objectives are quickly and effectively met.

Finally, the perennial issue of China, by which of course we mean the security and sovereignty of Taiwan. A perennial issue for some time, yes, but one that is getting progressively more real. The PRC “exercises” just off Taiwan’s coast are looking less like drills and more like preparations. Taiwan is exceedingly vulnerable to blockade, relying on imports for more than 90% of its energy needs, and that is exactly what Beijing’s military is practicing. The Trump administration’s approval of weapons for Taipei is necessary are encouraging, but approvals are a far cry from deliver, which must happen at once. Again, adding a bit of clarity to our deliberately ambiguous strategy concerning the Formosa Strait would seem to be in order. This needs to start with a formal recognition of the strategic, even more than the economic and moral, importance to the U.S. of an independent (in fact if not in name) Taiwan.

Kelly Sloan is a political and public affairs consultant and a recovering journalist based in Denver.