The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on Monday that a 2022 state law allows jurors to hear about a victim’s suicidal intentions when determining if a defendant is guilty of selling fentanyl and causing the victim’s death.

The justices interpreted for the first time a relatively new law imposing harsher penalties for those who distribute the synthetic opioid fentanyl. The year the measure passed, 920 people in Colorado died due to fentanyl overdoses. As a result, a defendant can now be sentenced to eight to 32 years in prison if distributing fentanyl was “the proximate cause” of a victim’s death.

However, in the El Paso County prosecution of Patrick L. Beverly II, it was unclear whether jurors in his case would be allowed to hear evidence that the man to whom he sold fentanyl seemed intent on dying by suicide — calling into question whether the sale of drugs was, in fact, what legally caused the death.

By 5-2, the Supreme Court decided the victim’s suicidality was something jurors may consider.

“Had the General Assembly intended to trigger an enhanced penalty anytime a fentanyl distribution ‘results in’ a user’s death, it could have said so,” wrote Chief Justice Monica M. Márquez in the May 5 opinion. “Though a fentanyl distributor should foresee that distributing fentanyl may result in death by accidental overdose, the distributor should not necessarily be expected to foresee, in every case, that a purchaser will make the ‘abnormal’ decision to intentionally die by way of ingesting ‘extraordinary’ amounts of fentanyl.”

Justice Brian D. Boatright disagreed. Writing for himself and Justice Maria E. Berkenkotter, he believed the inherent lethality of fentanyl necessarily makes a buyer’s death foreseeable. If selling fentanyl starts the “chain of events” leading to a victim’s death, that is enough for a conviction.

“Whether the person intended to end their life is irrelevant,” wrote Boatright.

Colorado Springs police found Matthew Bowen dead from a fentanyl overdose one night in August 2023. Evidence suggested Beverly sold Bowen dozens of fentanyl pills hours earlier. Prosecutors charged Beverly with fentanyl distribution resulting in death.

Prior to trial, the district attorney’s office sought to withhold a key detail from the jury: that Bowen was seemingly suicidal at the time Beverly provided him with fentanyl. The county coroner noted signs of Bowen’s suicidality and testified that Bowen’s levels of the powerful drug were “extraordinarily high.”

“I think the jury’s just going to get confused because it doesn’t matter if it’s a suicide,” Deputy District Attorney Lance Johnston said in arguing for the exclusion. “I don’t want the jurors to come across and say, ‘Well, he got exactly what he wanted. Why should we hold anyone responsible?'”

But that is the risk, countered District Court Judge Marcus Henson, of prosecuting distribution resulting in death, instead of just distribution.

“Because it almost begs the question: If there is the death, then the jury should have some opportunity to consider not only whether or not it was the defendant’s actions that maybe resulted in the death, but whether or not there’s something else contributing to the death,” he said.

Henson determined the jury should hear the evidence about Bowen’s suicidality when deciding if Beverly’s actions caused the death.

The district attorney’s office appealed immediately to the Supreme Court, arguing the victim’s intent in taking the drugs did not matter.

“In this regard, distributing fentanyl to a drug abuser who may or may not be suicidal is comparable to giving a firearm to a child. In either case, it is reasonably foreseeable that the someone could be gravely injured or killed as a result of the act of distribution,” wrote Senior Deputy District Attorney Doyle Baker.

The Colorado Attorney General’s Office, writing in defense of Henson’s ruling, noted there were two ways to read the 2022 law: Either it did not distinguish between accidental and intentional overdoses — meaning Beverly could be guilty simply for selling the drugs that caused Bowen’s death — or the mention of “proximate cause” required a look into whether there was anything else that triggered death after the sale.

“Judge Henson requests this Court’s guidance as to which reading of the statute is correct,” wrote Assistant Solicitor General Joseph G. Michaels.

Márquez, in the majority opinion, explained proximate cause means there is a connection between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury. It is possible, though, for certain events to break that connection if they are unforeseen. She wrote that jurors should be able to weigh whether Bowen’s suicidality was an unforeseen, intervening cause of his death.

Márquez cautioned that evidence of a victim’s mindset might not work to the defendant’s advantage in every case.

“What if evidence showed the purchaser was unaware that the purchased drugs contained fentanyl?” she wrote. “In that scenario, a reasonable jury might conclude that the defendant effectively participated in the purchaser’s suicide by distributing drugs the defendant knew were more potent than the purchaser believed.”

Márquez added that if a defendant knew about a person’s suicidality and sold them fentanyl anyway, a jury could decide to hold the defendant liable.

Boatright, in dissent, maintained the lethal nature of unprescribed fentanyl made Bowen’s death “practically expected.”

“Selling fentanyl obtained on the black market is the equivalent of selling someone a gun and bullets, knowing that the purchaser plans to repeatedly play Russian Roulette,” Boatright argued. “Death of the person buying the gun and bullets, under those circumstances, is not only foreseeable, but virtually inevitable.”

The case is People v. Beverly.