Colorado justices find Denver judge appropriately subbed in alternate juror mid-deliberations
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded on Monday that a Denver judge did what he needed to do to ensure a defendant received a fair trial after one juror became ill in the middle of deliberations and had to be replaced with the alternate.
Ricardo Castro’s jury deliberated for 11 hours total until it recessed on Friday evening. One juror’s daughter subsequently alerted then-District Court Judge Morris B. Hoffman that her father had a heart attack over the weekend and could not return to finish the case.
The defense would not agree to proceeding with 11 jurors and the prosecution did not want a mistrial. Hoffman chose the third option and addressed the remaining jurors. Before sending them to deliberate, he had selected an alternate juror and told her not to discuss the case with anyone and to keep her mind open, just in case.
Would it be feasible, Hoffman asked the other jurors, to bring back the alternate and restart the deliberations from the beginning with her?
“If you don’t think you can do it, just let me know,” he added.
Half an hour later, Hoffman received a note from the jury. Of the two sex offenses Castro was charged with, the jurors had reached a unanimous verdict on Friday for one of them. They were close to unanimity on the second.
“If the question is whether we can approach new deliberations w/ an open mind, because the alternate will be bringing new perspective, yes, we believe it’s feasible. If the question is whether we can enter new deliberations in the same state of mind,“ read the note, “no, we can’t undo all the conversations/learning from prior deliberations.”
The jury’s note in People v. Castro.
Hoffman told the parties that legal precedent in Colorado assumed the substitution of a juror would harm the defendant in some way. But in this instance, “We’ve got a note from the jury that overcomes every dimension of that prejudice that you can imagine.”
He summoned the alternate juror and explained to everyone deliberations would need to start completely anew. Hoffman told the juror she could not let the others rely upon their previous discussions. Hoffman then asked each juror individually if they were able to do that. Yes, they all said.
Five-and-a-half hours later, they returned a guilty verdict.
Castro appealed his convictions, but a three-judge panel for the Court of Appeals believed Hoffman had “painstakingly” ensured the juror substitution still resulted in a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed with that conclusion.
“The trial court’s actions in this case provide a model for trial courts to apply,” wrote Justice Carlos A. Samour Jr. in the July 1 opinion.
Colorado Supreme Court Justices Carlos A. Samour Jr. and Richard L. Gabriel listen to Assistant Deputy Jefferson County Attorney Rebecca P. Klymkowsky during oral arguments in the County of Jefferson v. Beverly Stickle case during Courts in the Community on Thursday, Oct. 26, 2023, at Gateway High School in Aurora, Colo. (Timothy Hurst/Denver Gazette)
Although Castro contended the much shorter deliberation the second time suggested jurors truly did not start from scratch, Samour noted 5.5 hours are “substantial” and there may have been benign reasons the jury moved quicker — like better organization or less time selecting a foreperson.
Much of the court’s opinion pertained to the standard for reviewing juror substitutions after deliberations have started. Samour, writing for the majority, noted Colorado law is ambiguous about whether such substitutions are allowed, so it was reasonable to assume some harmful effect to the defendant. However, that assumption can be dissipated with appropriate precautions, like the ones Hoffman took.
“Even so, it would be preferable to have the legislature clarify its intent,” Samour added, as the appellate courts “remain in the dark about the legislative intent behind the statute.”
Justice Richard L. Gabriel wrote separately for himself and Justice William W. Hood III. Unlike the majority, Gabriel would have deemed it an error to bring in the alternate juror during deliberations, triggering the question of whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to Castro. Using that path, Gabriel reached the same conclusion: Hoffman’s safeguards ensured the jury understood its obligation to start anew after the substitution.
The case is Castro v. People.

