Members of the Colorado Supreme Court seemed sympathetic last week to the idea that trial judges, under the current rules for criminal cases, cannot restrict defense attorneys from investigating postconviction claims their clients raise when at least one of the claims has merit.

Convicted defendants may seek postconviction relief for specific reasons, including that their sentence is illegal, new evidence has come to light or their conviction violated the U.S. Constitution. Under the rules, a trial judge can deny a postconviction petition outright if the defendant is clearly not entitled to relief.

However, if a judge does not deny the motion, they “shall cause a complete copy of said motion” to be sent to the prosecution and, if the defendant has requested counsel, also send a complete copy to the public defender’s office. The public defender may then investigate or supplement the claims that have “arguable merit.”

The Colorado Attorney General’s Office, however, argued the Supreme Court should interpret the rule to allow trial judges to weed out the non-meritorious claims and only steer appointed counsel toward litigating the viable ones.

During oral arguments on June 17, multiple justices suggested that approach made sense in theory, but it is not what the rule says.

“I am sort of stuck on the actual language,” said Justice Maria E. Berkenkotter.

“Either the court finds the motion should be summarily denied,” added Justice Carlos A. Samour Jr., “or if it doesn’t, then it sends the entire motion to the PD’s office. … There’s nothing in between.”

In the case before the Supreme Court, Francine Erica Segura filed a petition following her conviction with numerous claims that she received ineffective assistance from counsel. Then-Denver District Court Judge Kenneth M. Laff rejected most claims outright, but appointed a lawyer to represent Segura on one allegation that appeared to have merit. Laff subsequently denied postconviction relief following a hearing.

The Court of Appeals determined Laff did not follow the proper procedure and Segura’s appointed attorney should have been able to address the entirety of Segura’s original claims.

The “restriction of postconviction counsel’s ability to provide full, professionally competent assistance necessarily hampered counsel’s ability to provide effective assistance of counsel and served to undermine the fundamental fairness of the proceeding itself,” wrote Judge Elizabeth L. Harris.

The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court, where both sides argued their reading of the rule was the most logical one. The government contended it makes no sense for judges to find only one claim has merit, yet be forced to also transmit numerous meritless claims to a defense attorney.

Segura countered that once a judge finds a defendant has raised a credible allegation, there is no need for the judge to screen out everything else before a lawyer can look at the petition. That approach, endorsed by the Court of Appeals, found little opposition from the Supreme Court.

“That may not be the best policy, but that seems to be what the rule is envisioning,” said Justice Richard L. Gabriel.

The court seemed less sure how to interpret a situation in which a lawyer, rather than a self-represented defendant, files the initial postconviction petition.

“I still think all you do is go back to the plain language of the rule,” said Erin Wigglesworth, Segura’s attorney. “You cannot partially deny any petition.”

The case is People v. Segura.