Exercising its authority to bypass the state’s appellate court, the Colorado Supreme Court on Monday ruled that even though a criminal defendant had some role in the delay to his trial, a lower court and prosecutors violated his right to a speedy trial because it was their responsibility to commerce the proceedings in a timely manner.

In October 2018, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of Edward Kevin DeGreat’s conviction for aggravated robbery and ordered a new trial where DeGreat could introduce evidence to prove that his actions were self-defense. Two months later, the district court asked for a status conference between the attorneys to lay out a timeline for the trial. However, neither the defense nor the prosecution of the 18th Judicial District attempted to schedule the conference, and the judge did not pursue it further.

It was not until June 2019 that DeGreat filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the state violated his right to a speedy trial. Colorado statute requires new trials to occur within six months after a district court receives such a mandate. Another four months passed without any response from the district court or the prosecution. Then in October, one year after the Supreme Court’s order, the district court denied DeGreat’s motion, citing the failure of “both the People and Defendant” to schedule a conference.

DeGreat appealed directly to the Supreme Court again, claiming that the district court no longer had jurisdiction to try him. The high court, exercising the “extraordinary remedy” under Rule 21 to bypass the normal appeals process, found that the district court “would be proceeding without jurisdiction if it were to try DeGreat in violation of his rights under Colorado’s speedy trial statute.”

Writing for the court, Justice Melissa Hart acknowledged that DeGreat’s public defender did not comply with the scheduling order, but that was not the same thing as DeGreat’s consent to delay his retrial.

“A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial. Rather, that responsibility rests with the prosecution and the trial court,” she wrote. “Because respondents in this case failed to pursue retrial within the statutory speedy trial period, the remedy is dismissal with prejudice.”

There is an exception if the defendant causes the delay, which means he demonstrated an “express consent to the delay or other affirmative conduct.” Even though the prosecution and defense in DeGreat’s case agreed that he was partially responsible for the delay, Hart rejected that consensus.

“It is well-settled law that the burden of compliance with the speedy trial requirement rests with the prosecution and the trial court,” she concluded. “It was not DeGreat’s responsibility to pursue his own trial.”

The court dismissed the charges.

The case is The People of the State of Colorado v. Edward Kevin DeGreat.