Colorado’s second-highest court ruled last week that allegations of a juror’s anti-police statements during deliberations in a civil trial cannot trigger an inquiry into whether the juror’s bias requires a new trial.

Generally, jurors cannot be made to testify about statements made during deliberations when a party challenges the validity of a jury’s verdict. There are certain exceptions under the procedural rules, such as outside information improperly infiltrating the discussions. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized there may be instances of bias “so extreme” that they compromise the constitutional right to a jury trial. But so far, the Supreme Court has only identified one such instance: When a juror relies on racial bias to convict a defendant.

The question for Colorado’s Court of Appeals was whether the “constitutional exception,” as it is known, can stretch to include a juror’s anti-police statements in a civil trial where a police officer is the defendant. A three-judge appellate panel decided it cannot.

“Unlike racial bias, which the Supreme Court characterized as a ‘familiar and recurring evil’ that implicates unique institutional concerns, ‘neither history nor common experience shows that the jury system is rife with’ anti-police bias,” wrote Judge Elizabeth L. Harris in the May 1 opinion.

In the underlying case, Quinessa Caylao-Do was in a Denver alleyway one night in December 2019 when Officer John Logue accidentally ran over her with his vehicle. She sued Logue and the city for negligence. A jury found in Caylao-Do’s favor after a 2022 trial and awarded her damages.

Afterward, the defense moved for a new trial. They alleged two jurors talked to them after trial to say another juror — identified by the Court of Appeals as Juror S — was “clearly biased” against police. One juror also conveyed a similar sentiment to then-District Court Judge David H. Goldberg, saying Juror S “made it a very, very tough conversation and deliberation.”

One of the complaining jurors submitted a statement detailing multiple comments Juror S made:

• The “blue line protects their own”

• Denver and the police “always f–k up” and they are trying to “cover their ass”

• It was the jury’s job to “help” Caylao-Do

• Justice would be getting Denver to “cough up”

“There is no question that the jury had a vigorous and spirited discussion of the facts and the law in this case. There was frustration on the part of at least one juror, as is often the case, but in the end all the jurors were able to agree on a final judgment that reflects the collective opinion of every one of the jurors,” wrote Goldberg in denying the motion. He added that “the facts at issue does not rise to the level necessitating a new trial.”

Logue and the city appealed, arguing Juror S’s anti-police bias related to Logue’s “personal characteristic” of being a police officer. The defense likened that bias to the type addressed in the 2017 Supreme Court decision of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado. There, the justices found the Constitution permitted an inquiry into the jury’s deliberations after one juror allegedly made racist comments about Mexicans when advocating for a conviction.

But during oral arguments last year, the Court of Appeals panel was concerned about expanding the constitutional exception to occupation-based bias.

“If somebody exhibited bias against any occupation — draw me some lines around how far you propose to extend this,” said Judge Katharine E. Lum.

Harris asked about medical malpractice cases, where jurors might say, “‘Well, doctors, they’re just careless. They’re money-grubbing.’ So, now is that part of the constitutional exception?” she wondered.

Assistant City Attorney Honor K. Moore responded that not every occupation would be affected.

“There have been four years of cultural conflict regarding police officers,” she said. “This rule would only apply to very clear statements that clearly affected the verdict and which a party could make that showing” of bias.

Harris pushed back, saying Juror S’s statements — that the jury should “help” Caylao-Do or Denver should “cough up” damages — did not strike her as anti-police bias. Further, Juror S’s comment about police “protecting” and “covering” for each other might have been a reference to evidence of the defendants’ shifting account of the accident.

“I don’t think that saying the city of Denver and police ‘always f–k up’ and they’re trying to ‘cover their ass’ is a comment on the evidence,” responded Moore.

Ultimately, the panel’s opinion noted no court had extended the Supreme Court’s racial bias exception to cover any other situation. Harris explained the prohibition against inquiring into jury verdicts serves to encourage vigorous discussions and insulate jurors against harassment.

The limited exception for racial bias exists, she wrote, since it “is particularly difficult to root out because traditional safeguards are not effective at disclosing that kind of bias.”

The panel also rejected another argument from the defense that Goldberg should have allowed the defendants to remove, or strike, a Black juror who ended up serving. Although litigants can typically strike some number of potential jurors without a reason, the Supreme Court has deemed it a constitutional violation when those strikes are based on the juror’s race.

The defense attempted to remove one of two or three Black jurors, a woman identified as Juror W. When Caylao-Do’s lawyers raised an objection, the defense justified its strike as “race-neutral” because Juror W shared several characteristics with Caylao-Do and would likely be sympathetic to her. The plaintiff’s attorneys pointed to other jurors who shared those characteristics who the defense had not struck.

Goldberg declined to remove Juror W, believing she would be fair and that the strike was, more likely than not, improperly based on her race.

The panel saw no reason to overturn Goldberg’s finding, but Harris elaborated that the defense still would need to show Juror W’s participation on the jury harmed them.

“The City has not alleged, much less shown, that Juror W was biased or otherwise incompetent to serve on the jury,” she concluded.

The case is Caylao-Do v. Logue.