The Colorado Supreme Court signaled last month that it may intervene in an ongoing criminal case against a defendant seeking to be tried as a juvenile, and potentially stop a man from continuing to sue the same group of people after a steady stream of judges has disposed of his claims.

In the first case out of Denver, defense attorneys asked the court to provide guidance about multiple issues that had never been addressed before.

In February 2024, prosecutors charged Clayshjon Eugene Clark-Collins with 15 counts related to aggravated robbery and weapons possession. Clark-Collins was a few months shy of 18 at the time, and the defense requested a “reverse transfer hearing.” The proceeding would address whether his case should be moved from district court, where he faced up to 32 years in prison if convicted, to juvenile court, where Clark-Collins would face less punitive consequences.

At a June 10 hearing, Clark-Collins’ defense attorney requested a three-day reverse transfer hearing. District Court Judge Eric M. Johnson interrupted to say he would set it for half a day instead.

During a follow-up appearance, Johnson explained why he believed “this can be done promptly without four, five or six days, which is often set here in Denver.”

Ticking through the 11 factors in state law that judges must consider before granting a transfer to juvenile court, Johnson said Clark-Collins’ criminal history and the seriousness of the charges were self-evident, and he did not need to hear testimony about the science behind young adults’ maturity.

“What’s left really can get done in a day,” he added.

In September, Johnson issued a written order announcing that he was combining the reverse transfer hearing with a preliminary hearing, which requires prosecutors to demonstrate probable cause exists to bring the case to trial. Johnson wrote that the “vast majority of the evidence” he would consider for the reverse transfer hearing would take the form of documents.

Moreover, all evidence able to be put in writing “will be submitted to the Court 30 days prior to the hearing,” he wrote.

Clark-Collins’ lawyers asked Johnson to reconsider, pointing out multiple problems with the proposed sequencing. First, they argued Johnson had unnecessarily and unrealistically limited the duration of the reverse transfer hearing.

“It is not possible for these witnesses to testify in just half a day. Thus, the Court’s current standing order will prevent Clayshjon Clark-Collins from defending himself at the reverse-transfer hearing,” the defense attorneys wrote.

Second, by requiring the defense to disclose Clark-Collins’ medical and educational records 30 days before the reverse transfer hearing, the prosecution would have access to confidential or sensitive information that would not normally be available for the probable cause hearing — scheduled for the same day.

On Feb. 10, 2025, Johnson refused to alter the process as envisioned. Advance disclosure of evidence before a hearing is “not a novel concept and is regularly done,” he wrote. As for the limitation of the reverse transfer hearing to half a day, Johnson reiterated that he wanted to read as much information as possible in advance, so that “any testimony would be limited to that which is relevant to the factors the Court is to weigh.”

Clark-Collins’ attorneys turned to the Supreme Court for intervention. They attached a chart showing many reverse transfer hearings in Denver District Court that lasted multiple days, and sometimes more than a week.

“Here, by allotting the Juvenile just a half-day to present evidence,” wrote the defense attorneys, “this Court is drastically curtailing the Juvenile’s ability to confront witnesses and to present a defense as compared to the opportunities given to other (defendants) in Denver District Court over the last decade.”

Regarding Johnson’s directive that the disclosure of confidential information occur 30 days before the combined reverse transfer and probable cause hearing, the defense lawyers noted that even if Clark-Collins’ case moves to juvenile court, “the prosecutor will still have the benefit of the child’s privileged mental health and medical records.”

On Feb. 28, the Supreme Court ordered the prosecution and Johnson to respond to the concerns raised by the defense.

The case is People v. Clark-Collins.

In 2011, a civil complaint about a business dispute was filed in Denver District Court, with Kenneth O’Hanlon as the defendant.

But in the decade since, O’Hanlon, representing himself, has deluged the court system with numerous filings and motions against his adversaries, many of which judges denied or found outright frivolous. No fewer than 17 judges across several courts have addressed O’Hanlon’s claims and have repeatedly admonished him:

• “The record demonstrates that Mr. O’Hanlon has a history of ignoring court orders,” wrote U.S. District Court Senior Judge R. Brooke Jackson

• There is “simply no basis for O’Hanlon’s innumerable filings in this case which has long been resolved,” wrote retired Jefferson County District Court Judge Stephen M. Munsinger

• “By now, he should have been aware that his endless efforts to litigate the same issues are, and have been, vexatious and frivolous,” wrote Court of Appeals Judge Ted C. Tow III

In May 2024, Denver District Court Judge Jon J. Olafson barred O’Hanlon from filing anything further in the original 2011 civil dispute. Olafson noted O’Hanlon’s repeated filings in a case that had been closed for over a decade were sucking up resources from the court and from the parties on the other side.

“The Court also finds that Defendant O’Hanlon’s conduct has become egregious. While it may cost Defendant O’Hanlon very little to file repetitive and improper claims, motions, and exhibits, other litigants suffer from this abuse of the justice system,” Olafson wrote.

On Feb. 18, several attorneys and entities who had been subjected to O’Hanlon’s filings over the years asked the Supreme Court to step in and prevent O’Hanlon from submitting anything else to the state judiciary without an attorney. They wrote that O’Hanlon had been ordered to pay $210,000 in their attorney fees and costs. They also alleged O’Hanlon filed 14 motions in a single day in 2016.

“Still, he has continued to pursue largely the same claims against the same individuals and entities,” the petitioners wrote. “When appeals are exhausted and cases are closed, O’Hanlon repeatedly requests that they be reopened and then appeals the denial of his requests.”

On Feb. 25, the Supreme Court directed O’Hanlon to explain why he should not be barred from making further filings.

The case is O’Hanlon v. Mann et al.