It has become a bit of a personal tradition of mine to write my final column of the year as something of a review of the world scene. I am hardly one to buck tradition, so let’s commence:

The predominant international event of the past year has unquestioningly been Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war that continues to slog toward its first anniversary. I have pointed out in this space before, the global impacts of the conflict, the most practical and immediate one being the illumination of the existential need for realistic energy policy. Germany serves as the most prominent example. That country dabbled as much or more than any other in the chimera of “green energy,” quietly confident that they assumed no real risk in eschewing fracking, or coal, or nuclear power, knowing that hordes of Russian natural gas lay just a short pipeline trip away.

Russia’s war changed all that; now Germany and other European countries are scrambling to re-ignite coal-fired plants, put nuclear power online, and find new sources of oil and gas. Even with these efforts Europe is now a net importer of chemicals for the first time in the modern age, and can do little but pray for a mild winter to mitigate the most tragic of consequences.

Of course, the more abstract and longer-term impact of the war is the adjustment in the geopolitical zeitgeist. Clear minds never really bought into the post-Cold War dream of a neutered pacific Russia that would simply osmose into Western Civilization. The invasion of Ukraine merely punctuated the point in a rather direct, brutal and unavoidable manner. With due apologies to the brilliant Francis Fukuyama and his often-misinterpreted book, it appears history has not yet ended in Europe.

In terms of military strategy, the preeminent consideration is the surprising success of the Ukrainian forces, or perhaps more accurately the unexpected incompetence of the Russian military. Russia’s failure to attain air superiority and win the war – or even hold substantial territorial gains – in the first days or weeks caused a lot of pause buttons to be pressed around the world. We may never know for sure, but it is entirely possible, for example, that that failure brought not just the Russian army to a thudding halt in Ukraine, but also possibly Russian plans for Georgia or the Kaliningrad Oblast. Certainly it raised some eyebrows and frustrated some operations officers in Beijing.

Which brings us to the other focal point of global anxiety, China. One cannot talk about China’s threat to world order, peace and stability in the western Pacific without talking about Taiwan, which Beijing ostensibly views (incorrectly) as a renegade province of the People’s Republic, but more importantly views (correctly) as an impediment to Red Chinese naval ambitions in the Pacific. The failure of Russia’s air force in the Ukraine may have bought Taipei some time; nonetheless, China has stepped up its saber-rattling in the Formosa strait, starting with its aggressive drills around the island following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit there in August.

Just a few days ago, over the Christmas weekend, the PRC sent a record number of combat planes and ships across the median line separating the two China’s, the largest incursion yet by Chinese Communist forces into Taiwanese territory. This in response to “aggressive” U.S. moves in the National Defense Authorization Act which included some moderate baby steps toward helping Taiwan fend off a likely Chinese invasion, including a relatively paltry $10 billion over the next five years to finance weapons, ammunition and other military hardware to Taipei, as well as provide training and other assistance.

This episode highlights the need for a more clearly defined U.S. policy toward Taiwan – not only in terms of military assurances and assistance, but in trade as well. Strengthening our economic ties with a regional ally and civilizational kindred soul would be in both Taiwan’s and America’s best interest. “Supply chain issues” has become a year-defining term for 2022, much like “social distancing” was for 2020, “hanging chad” was for 2000, and “I did not have sexual relations with that woman” was for 1996. And a great deal of those supply chain woes are traceable to China and its barbaric, every-step-a-mistake COVID policy. Much could be alleviated by shifting our economic allegiances from the PRC to the ROC, starting with including Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum and pushing ahead with a bilateral free trade agreement with Taipei.

Dealing ably with all of the above, plus other places – most notably Iran and the ever-combustible Middle East – requires a clear-headed and focused American foreign policy, something we haven’t really had since at least 2009. Gov. Jared Polis has ambitions to be president, as does Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis and a few others. Whoever runs in 2024 will need to have serious approaches to these problems, and lets hope they use 2023 to formulate them.

Kelly Sloan is a political and public affairs consultant and a recovering journalist based in Denver.