Although the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision earlier this year making it easier to strike down gun safety regulations under the Second Amendment, a federal judge has disagreed with a man’s contention that he cannot now be prosecuted in Colorado under a longstanding law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.

Perrion Gray, who is facing one federal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, tried to argue the June 23 ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen precludes his prosecution. In Bruen, the conservative-majority Supreme Court directed that laws implicating the right to keep and bear arms are only constitutional when they are “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

Gray argued that “felon-disarmament laws” did not, in fact, have any tie to the Founding period and the adoption of the Second Amendment.

“It appears that no American jurisdiction enacted such a law until the 20th Century, and Congress did not pass the federal statute at issue here until 1938,” wrote Assistant Federal Public Defender Kilie Latendresse on behalf of Gray.

But U.S. District Court Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney observed it was not necessary for a modern-day firearm regulation to mirror a law in existence in the 1790s for it to be constitutional.

“It is undisputed that jurisdictions throughout history have had the ability to regulate the possession of a weapon,” she wrote in a Nov. 10 order declining to dismiss the indictment against Gray.

The Bruen decision itself struck down a century-old New York law governing the concealed carry of firearms in public, but it also laid the groundwork for further challenges to gun safety policies on the grounds that they do not conform to the historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Colorado quickly became a hotbed for gun rights lawsuits, with multiple cases pending in federal court that seek to void bans on “assault weapons” in Boulder County and several of its municipalities. There is also litigation to strike down Colorado’s statewide ban on large-capacity gun magazines, which the legislature enacted after the 2012 mass murder in an Aurora movie theater.

Judges elsewhere have applied Bruen’s logic to find, for example, the federal law prohibiting guns without serial numbers to be unconstitutional, and to block a New York law that bans guns in houses of worship.

Gray, in his motion to dismiss the firearm count against him, argued Bruen requires courts to evaluate the constitutionality of gun laws against regulations that were “widespread and commonly accepted” at the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption.

He also referenced the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision of District of Columbia v. Heller, which first recognized an individual right to possess firearms. The motion pointed out that while the Supreme Court in Heller labeled felon-disarmament laws as “longstanding,” the Court did not undertake the type of historical analysis of those laws of the kind it has now endorsed in Bruen.

“Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text suggests that those who have been convicted of a felony are not entitled to the amendment’s protections,” Latendresse wrote.

The prosecution pushed back on Gray’s argument, noting the Bruen case involved non-felons seeking to carry concealed weapons. Consequently, laws that only permit “law-abiding citizens” to possess firearms are permissible under the Second Amendment.

“Because he is not a law-abiding citizen, the Defendant had no right to posses a firearm,” wrote Assistant U.S. Attorney Conor A. Flanigan, who also cited to historical exclusions on firearm possession for convicted criminals.

Sweeney, in her ruling, noted other trial judges within the region have already weighed in on similar challenges. While some judges found the federal prohibition on firearm possession by felons did not implicate the Second Amendment, Sweeney believed that even felons are covered by the amendment’s protections.

However, she agreed the Bruen decision did not warrant striking down the law in question because it did not contradict Heller‘s previous finding that regulations aimed at felons are historically-rooted and permissible.

The case is United States v. Gray.